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12 March 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Syria: A shake-up in the Syrian cabinet appears imminent, instigated by the Syrian Army Revolutionary Command which effectively rules the country from behind the scenes. [redacted] changes are likely within the next few days. Incumbent Prime Minister Dawalibi has come under increasing criticism from military as well as Baathist and other leftist elements, who consider him irresolute and ineffective. [redacted] the next prime minister is likely to be leftist Nationalist party leader Sabri al-Asali, but the US army attaché reports persistent rumors in Damascus that former Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm is slated for the post. Azm is believed to be favored by the army, while Asali appears to derive support from the Baathists and is said to be preferred by President Qudsi. [redacted]

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Congo: In recent separate talks with Ambassador Gullion, both Adoula and Kasavubu denied any intention of making war on Tshombé in the near future, insisting that the mission of their recently reinforced troops in northern Katanga was only to bring "order" to the area. At the same time, they reflected doubt that the 15 March Adoula-Tshombé negotiations in Leopoldville will contribute to an early settlement of the Katanga problem. Kasavubu, commenting that too much emphasis had been placed on the possibility of a short-term solution, either military or diplomatic, said he "counts on time to take care of Tshombé." Gullion believes that the Congolese leaders' main objective now is to hold their own vis-a-vis the Katangan leader while gradually creating, perhaps with Belgian support, a reliable military force capable of bringing a still-recalcitrant Tshombé into line at some future date.]

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There are some indications that the Congolese, particularly General Mobutu, are already playing the Belgians off against the UN. Belgium's newly arrived chargé has indicated that Mobutu is counting mainly on direct Belgian aid outside the framework of the UN operation to reorganize the Congolese Army--a preference which the chargé, a strong critic of the UN, has apparently been encouraging. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, on the other hand, is reported to have intervened recently to halt the departure from Brussels, pending receipt of approval from the UN, of 12 Belgian officers assigned as advisers to the Congolese Army's headquarters staff.

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[REDACTED]

Communist China - India: Peiping has reportedly taken the completion of India's elections as the opportunity to propose resumption of talks on the Sino-Indian border dispute and renegotiation of the treaty governing Indo-Tibetan trade. The reported Chinese note is the third in an exchange with the Indians regarding renewal of the 1954 trade treaty, which expires in June. The Chinese value the treaty because of its enunciation of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and because it provides for three Chinese trade agencies in India. The Indians, who derive only marginal benefits from the treaty at present, indicated in a prior note that renewal would be pointless so long as the Chinese "illegally" occupy Indian-claimed territory along the northern border. It is doubtful that the Indian response will be very forthcoming unless the text of the note, which is not yet available, suggests to New Delhi that there has been a significant shift in the Chinese attitude since the last discussions more than a year ago.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

***Burma:** Rumors persist in Rangoon of American and Thai support for separatist sentiment in the Shan states and could be the forerunner of public charges along these lines by the new military government of General Ne Win. These rumors, possibly encouraged or even initiated by army officers, allege that the leaders of the Shan states, abetted by Americans and Thais, planned

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 [] to secede from Burma, set up an independent state, and join SEATO. Brigadier Aung Gyi, Ne Win's second in command, has publicly denied any evidence of connection between SEATO and the Shans, and relations between the new government and American officials in Rangoon have thus far been cordial. Ne Win, however, has apparently been unsuccessful in efforts to persuade U Nu to retire from the political scene quietly, and may soon feel a need to voice publicly charges of foreign intervention in Burmese affairs to justify his ouster of Nu's civilian government on 2 March and to make the reimposition of authoritarian government more acceptable to the Burmese public. Popular opinion in Burma has long held the United States at least indirectly responsible for the presence of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in northeastern Burma, and probably finds it easy to believe charges of US involvement with the Shans. 25X1

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 25X1 [] *African High Command: [] The permanent headquarters of the Casablanca powers' much-ballyhooed "Joint African High Command" reportedly will be activated in Accra immediately after the planned meeting in Cairo, probably early next month, of the heads of the participating governments--Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR, and the Algerian rebel regime. Among the publicized purposes of this joint military command, which has been in the process of formation since January 1961, is the supply of "military assistance to other states," which presumably is meant to include arms aid to nationalist elements in dependent territories of Africa. [] 25X1

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 25X1 [] cause of basic logistical and other deficiencies in the participants' military establishments, the command is likely to remain for some time largely a paper organization. Its various promoters, however, particularly Ghana's Nkrumah, can be expected to try to develop it as an effective instrument of their militant, frequently anti-Western, pan-African policies. They may []

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[redacted] turn more and more to the Communist bloc, which is already providing some military support to all the Casablanca states, for assistance. The announcement of a joint military headquarters is certain to heighten suspicions and apprehensions among the nonparticipating African states regarding the aims of the new command. [redacted]

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Cuba: The announcement on 9 March of the formation of a National Directorate of the Integrated or Revolutionary Organizations (ORI)--described by the Cuban press as an important step in the planned evolution of the ORI toward becoming the United Party of the Socialist Revolution--merely formalizes a situation which has existed since the ORI was formed last August. For some months the ORI leaders have formed the regime's top policy-making body, and the party machinery has developed interlocking functions and leadership with all organs of the state, down to the local level.

The list of 25 ORI national directors, headed by Fidel Castro, includes all the key leaders who have controlled this political machine since its official formation in August. Also on the directorate are individuals who do not play a leading role in policy formation but who are included as representatives of the political groups--Castro's 26 of July Movement and the small Revolutionary Directorate--which "merged" with the Communists' long-extant Popular Socialist party (PSP) to form the ORI. Of the 25 directors, ten are veteran PSP leaders, ten were prominent in the 26 of July Movement, one was the leader of the Revolutionary Directorate, and the remaining four are not known to have been affiliated with any prior political group. [redacted]

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Peru: Communist-led unions have threatened a general strike unless three American officials of the Lima branch of the National City Bank of New York leave the country by Wednesday morning. The three officials forcibly ejected a Communist

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labor leader from the bank's premises last Thursday when he was urging bank employees to join a street demonstration sympathizing with Indian squatters evicted by the militia from Peruvian-owned haciendas in the Andean highlands.

Communists and other leftists have been centering propaganda attacks on US-owned interests in Peru, apparently in an attempt to embarrass the pro-US conservative government during the campaign period before the 10 June presidential election.

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National Directorate of Cuban Political Machine Announced

If the development of the ORI continues to follow the pattern of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the National Directorate is likely to become the equivalent of the Soviet party central committee. Only about half of those named to the directorate play a leading role in the formulation of policy; it is from these individuals that the Cuban equivalent of the Soviet party presidium is likely to be drawn.

Although veteran Communists hold only ten of the 25 seats on the ORI National Directorate, there is little doubt that they will dominate it. The others have already demonstrated that they are subject to Communist control, and a number of them may well have been secret members of the Communist party for some years.

Major Juan Almeida, army chief of staff, could be one exception. His relatively devout Catholicism has reportedly been a source of concern to the Communists, and he is reported on one occasion to have shown lack of respect for a group of Soviet officials and their families. He is personally devoted to Fidel Castro, however, and, though not considered particularly intelligent or capable, is useful as a symbol of Negro solidarity with the regime.

The list of ORI directors as issued--on which Fidel Castro is followed immediately by his brother Raul, Che Guevara, and President Dorticos--does not reflect the members' relative importance in the formulation of policy. Blas Roca, secretary general of the PSP since 1935 and recently the ORI's most authoritative spokesman, is named fifth, whereas in tenth place--well ahead of such important Communist leaders as Lazaro Pena, Joaquin Ordoqui, and Cesar Escalante--is Fauré Chomon, former leader of the dissolved Revolutionary Directorate, whose present role as Cuban ambassador in Moscow has been largely that of a technician permitted little if any initiative. [REDACTED]

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Peruvian Union Demands Deportation of Three Americans

Labor leader Jorge Zapata Cuadra, a Communist, on 8 March entered a restricted area of the Lima branch of the National City Bank of New York to harangue the employees during a "demonstration of sympathy" with the Indian squatters. The Communist-dominated bank employees' union, FEB, charges that the Indians--several of whom were killed--had been driven from lands owned by the US-owned mining company, Cerro de Pasco Corporation. It accordingly directed its demonstration against US-owned businesses in Lima, and singled out the National City Bank of New York because its employees had refused to join FEB. The Lima police broke up the demonstration with tear gas and clubs before Zapata was ousted from the National City Bank.

Although the FEB has only 7,000 members, Communist influence in other Lima unions--particularly of transportation and electrical workers--is great enough to paralyze the city if they all join the strike. The Peruvian Banking Association, a management organization, has agreed to support the National City Bank but has not indicated what form this support would take.

The conservative Peruvian Government, attempting to reduce antigovernment sentiment before the June elections, has for the past two or three months taken a conciliatory stand on demands of leftist-dominated labor unions, particularly in controversies involving US-owned companies. In the face of further demonstrations and riots inspired by Communists and Castroites, the government may well decide that deportation of the three US bank officials is the better part of valor. [REDACTED]

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Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

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The National Security Agency

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